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THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF CIVIL LAW AND
THE CIVILIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW*
Boris Kozolchyk**
I.NTRODUCTION
This topic requires that one first clarify what is meant by civil
law and by commercial law. One might be tempted to assert
positivistically that civil law is the law found in civil codes and com-
mercial law is the law found in commerical codes. Yet, legal history
proves that it has been very difficult, if not impossible, to draft a
code that applies exclusively to civil or commercial transactions.
Even where the draftsmen of separate civil and commercial codes
adopted what they thought to be neat lines of differentiation or
scope criteria, it was clear, almost before the ink had dried, that
they had failed in their attempts at separation.
The first to try separation was Napoleonic France with its so-
called objective criterion,' a criterion followed by the majority of
other civil law countries. The scope of the French Commercial Code
of 1807 was determined by inquiring whether the parties had
entered into "an act of commerce," such as, a purchase and sale of
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goods or merchandise for their resale, enterprises of manufacture,
commission agency, transportation, public spectacles, exchange,
banking and brokerage, construction, or maritime commerce, or
whether the parties had signed or endorsed a promissory note or a
bill of exchange.2 By contrast, the subjective criterion defined the
scope of a commercial code on the basis of the merchant's profes-
sional affiliation. A subjective commercial code applied only to those
who qualified as habitual and professional merchants. This approach,
which was implicit in the eighteenth century Prussian Allgemeine
Landrecht, was expressly adopted by some of Germany's nineteenth
century commercial codes and prevails in the German Commercial
Code of 1900.1 The professionals chosen under the subjective
criterion included predominantly bankers and traders. Primary pro-
ducers were not included because they treasured their monopolistic
status, inconsistent as it was with the competition principles of the
commercial codes. Agricultural business was similarly uninterested
in the competitive capitalism of the commercial code. Also exempted
from the commercial characterization were those who thought bet-
ter of themselves, such as members of the liberal professions, in-
cluding physicians (however enterprising), actors, attorneys, authors,
composers and teachers.'
By defining the commercial code as objective, the French
codifiers attempted to avoid the stigma of conferring a privileged
status to a class of citizens, anathema as privileges were to the
revolutionary principle of equality before the law. Thus, in principle,
the French Commercial Code applied to acts of commerce by mer-
chants, as well as to those acts of commerce entered into by non-
merchants, such as law professors, opera singers, or priests.
On the other hand, the French Civil Code dealt with matters
such as a person's legal status, regulating that status from birth un-
til death. Included in the regulation of a person's status were such
aspects as: his domestic and family relations; his obligations, both
contractual and extra-contractual; his non-profit associations; and his
acquisition, use, and disposition, both inter vivos and mortis causa,
of personal and real property. In addition, it provided principles of
general application to transactions both within and beyond its con-
fines, such as:
Laws relating to public order and morals cannot be derogated
from by private agreement.5
2. See C. Com. art. 632 (Fr.).
3. See generally Freinfels, The Problem of Including Commercial Law in a Civil
Code, in PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION 90, 98-100 (Soltjar ed. 1977).
4. ld
5. C. civ. art. 6 (Fr.) (writer's trans.).
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Contracts lawfully entered into have the force of law for those
who have made them. They can only be cancelled by mutual con-
sent or by causes allowed by law. They must be carried out in
good faith.'
Possession is the equivalent of title with respect to personal prop-
erty.7
Any human act which causes damage to another obligates the
person through whose fault damage occurred to make reparation
for the damage.'
The generality of these and other principles contributed to the civil
code's status as the unofficial constitution of France's private law.
The problem with the objective-subjective dichotomy is that the
life of the law in general, and of commercial life in particular, is not,
as Justice Holmes continually reminds us, quite that syllogistic. One
who disagrees with Holmes should try to define an act of commerce,
such as "brokerage," without referring to the activity of the broker.
To make sense you would have to define brokerage by describing
brokers and vice versa; if you wish to define a broker, you must
describe what he, as a broker, does. Moreover, consider the case of
the so-called "mixed act," the act which is commercial for one of the
parties, say the seller, and civil i.e., not profit making, for the con-
suming buyer. Additionally, consider the act which starts out as a
civil act on the part of the buyer, but becomes profit-making once
the buyer realizes that he can profit by reselling that which he
bought with the initial purpose of only consuming.
The difficulty of drawing a neat line between that which is civil
and that which is commercial in everyday legal affairs does not
mean that there are no significant differences between the rules,
concepts, and principles of interpretation that characterize each of
these major branches of private law. The differences emerge once
one examines how civil and commercial law treat a simple, everyday
transaction such as a sale or conveyance of valuable property. Ac-
cordingly, certain key aspects in the regulation of such an ordinary
sale or conveyance will be examined first with respect to the French
Civil Code of 1804 and related decisional and doctrinal materials
and, subsequently, with respect to the United States Uniform Com-
mercial Code and related decisional and doctrinal sources. The
reason for the choice of codes is that, as the following sections will
indicate, in many respects each code contains some of the most
typical elements of a law-making tradition.
6. C. civ. art. 1134 (writer's trans.).
7. C. civ. art. 2279 (writer's trans.).
8. C. cIv. art. 1382 (writer's trans.).
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THE CIVIL LAW CONTEXT
Formality and Exclusion of Parol Evidence
One of the first observable features of the civil law regulation of
the simple transaction is its formality. If the conveyance is an inter
vivos donation, it must be executed before a notary public.? If it is
an onerous transaction, as for example, where land or valuable prop-
erty is conveyed for a price which exceeds 500 francs, either a
notarial deed or a writing "under private signature" is required.'
As if to underscore the importance of the formal document, the
French Civil Code states: "[N]o proof by witnesses against or beyond
the content of the document, nor as to what is alleged to have been
the content previously, at the time or since it was drawn up shall be
allowed, even if the sum or value in dispute is less than 500
francs."'1 This is but a confirmation of a principle expressed
elsewhere in the Code: "[An instrument in public form [that is to
say, a notarial deed] is absolute proof of the agreement which it con-
tains between the contracting parties and their heirs or legal
representatives.' 2
The absolute proof feature that accompanies the solemnity of a
notarial deed is so awe-inspiring that occasionally deeds are ex-
ecuted even when the parties know that the expressed obligations
are unenforceable in a court of law. For example, in Central
America, notarial deeds covenanting "love and support" are not un-
common. The promisor, usually a married man, notarially promises a
doubting or hesitating mistress-promisee his love and support for as
long as he lives. The notarially expressed intent thereby becomes an
act of ultimate reassurance in the face of nagging distrust.
Application to Face-to-Face Transactions and to Immediate Parties
The second observable feature of the codal regulation of the
chosen transaction is that if it resulted from correspondence be-
tween the parties, the Code provides very few, if any, rules through
which to elucidate problems such as whether the mailing of the ac-
ceptance by the offeree, its reception by the offeror, or knowledge
of its reception by the offeror is the time at which the acceptance
becomes binding on the offeree.'" Little attention was paid by the
9. C. civ. art. 931.
10. C. civ. art. 1341.
11. C. civ. art. 1341 (writer's trans.).
12. C. civ. art. 1319 (writer's trans.).
13. For a comparative discussion of some of the French Civil Code's shortcomings
in the regulation of contract law, see Von Mehren, The Code and Contract--A Com-
parative Analysis of Formation and Form, in THE CODE NAPOLEON 110-11 (B. Schwartz
ed, 1956).
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codifier to contracts by correspondence or inter ausentes. Moreover,
the codifier, while seeming to accept the concept of third party
beneficiary promises, limited them seriously. One of the limitations,
interpreted literally, prohibits an insurance contract covering the
value of conveyed property, where the assured was liable to pay the
premiums and the beneficiary was entitled to the indemnity. 4
Cause or the Reason for the Validity of Contractual Obligations
The Morality of Cause
Surprisingly for a common law lawyer, the promise to convey,
gratuitously, valuable real or personal property is valid and en-
forceable as long as the required formalities are met." The promisee
need not allege estoppel or detrimental reliance on the promise. The
promise is said to have a valid cause or basis for validity. The basis
for validity in a donation is the donative intent or a mere liberality."
The mere liberality of the gift can be questioned as a valid cause,
however, where the conveyance is to a "stranger" such as the gran-
tor's mistress; in such a case, a distinction may be drawn between
the stated and the impulsive cause." If the contract is bilateral or
synallagmatic, the basis for its enforceability from each party's
standpoint is the other party's obligation. This seeming reciprocity
of value constitutes the contract's cause. 8
The Code is concerned with the morality of cause in both
gratuitous and onerous contracts. It defines an illicit cause which
renders the obligation void as one not only prohibited by law but
also contrary to "good morals" and "public order" (ordre public).' A
1957 decision by the Cour de cassation illustrates the meaning of the
term "good morals." 0 A French middle-aged, middle-income father of
a family, possessed of a modest estate and a lusty sexual appetite,
conveyed the beneficial interest in his group life insurance policy to
a recently-acquired mistress. His widow and heirs sued the mistress
alleging the nullity of her designation as beneficiary. The trial and
appellate courts held that there was an immoral cause in the con-
veyance."' This finding, Professor Esmein tells us, is related to the
14. 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAIT9 ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL § 635 (3d ed. 1948), cited in
Von Mehren, supra note 13, at 111 n.2.
15. C. civ. arts. 894 & 1105.
16. C. civ. arts. 894, 1105, 1108 & 1131.
17. For a brief and up to date review of the morality of cause in gratuitous con-
tracts, see A. WEILL ET F. TERRE, LEs OBLIGATIONS nOS 280-81 (2d ed. 1975).
18. Id. at nos 254-55.
19. C. civ. art. 1133.




well-established case law in accordance with which a donation in
favor of a concubine is not per se invalid . . . as it can be valid in
the case of adulterous relationships. It is null, however, for an
immorality of the cause, when, appearing to be a donation, it is
in reality the payment of a price to bring about or to secure the
continuation of the concubinacy.12
This rationale could be seen as reflecting a judicial respect only for
the purest or the most virile variety of seduction, a distaste for
disguised forms of prostitution (pretium stupri), or both. Be that as
it may, the net effect of the ruling is to discourage conveyances
detrimental to one's widow and heirs; for, unless the designated
beneficiary could prove that she was conquered only by the
grantor's unadulterated erotic powers, the illicitude of the cause
would invalidate the conveyance.
Professor Capitant's classic study on cause in French and com-
parative law discusses similar decisions concerning real property
rented for purposes of prostitution or for the operation of gambling
houses and agreements involving the bribing or corruption of public
officials."3 The courts' distaste for such agreements can best be gauged
by their unwillingness to order restitution so as to bring about the
status quo ante. As expressed by an indignant court in Bourges in
1889, "such parties are not worthy of appearing before a court of
law.""
What is the moral or religious basis of this indignation?
Demogue argued that "good customs," as the basis of the morality
of the cause, should be based upon public opinion. 5 Dean Ripert
argued in favor of moral or theological foundations which one can
not fail to associate with Judeo-Christian principles of ethical
behavior." And Professor Esmein posited that the morality of cause,
at least when predicated on the notion of public order, is a malleable
concept adaptable to the changing times and needs-a concept
shaped by the judge, not by relying upon his own theology,
philosophy or personal bias, but inspired by the morality of the en-
tire corpus of law as it relates to the controversy.27
22. Esmein, Note accompanying Judgment of 8 oct. 1957, Cass. civ., D.1958.J.317
at 318 (writer's trans.).
23. H. CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS 226-27 (3d ed. 1927).
24. Judgment of 13 juin 1889, Bourges, D.P.1889.5.329 (writer's trans.), cited in H.
CAPITANT, supra note 23, at 243 n.2.
25. 2 M. DEMOGUE, TRAITtI DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL n0 773 bis. (1912), cited in
G. RIPERT, LA RtGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES n' 41 n.2 (3d ed. 1935).
26. G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at n ° 39.
27. Esmein, Note accompanying Judgment of 4 ddc. 1929, S.1931.1.49, transcribed
in H. CAPITANT, LES GRANDS ARRt9TS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE 10-12 (5th ed. 1970).
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An examination of the French decisions up until 1930, compiled
by Dean Ripert, indicates that French courts agreed at times with
one and at other times with all of the above criteria. 8 Yet, whatever
the court's formulation of the criterion, the morality espoused was
always consistent with that of a good father of a family.' This
meant a requirement of loyalty above all to his wife and children, in-
cluding protection and sustenance in accordance with his means and
station in life, and refraining from outrageous, ill-mannered, or
grievous conduct toward his family. As will be shown hereafter,
such a morality did not require a mutuality in obligations entered into
with non-family members; nor did this morality mandate an
equivalence, however approximate, of the values exchanged by pro-
misor and promisee in non-family obligations.
Cause, Lesion, and Just Price
An exchange of a rough equivalent of value between promisor
and promisee was a requirement only when the seller had sold real
property and received a price of less than seven-twelfths of the
market value of the property. The Code provides that if the vendor
suffered a loss of more than seven-twelfths of the price of a piece of
property, he may demand rescission although he expressly donated
the excess." One should note that the Code refers in this regard only
to the vendor, who alone is afforded the privilege of rescission.
The protection from "objective" lesion, the significant dispropor-
tion between exchanged and received value as measured by what
was given by the promisee or what he was led to believe he would
receive as an heir, was intended by the Code to apply to family prop-
erty. By family property is meant property of significant economic
value in the composition of the family estate. The tenor and scope of
the French Civil Code's provisions on lesion are clear: articles 1118
and 1313 limit the availability of rescission because of lesion to ex-
pressly designated legal relationships. With the sole exception of
the seller of real property who receives less than one-half of the
market price, the designated legal relationships are all familial in
nature, such as those between a decedent and his heirs, or between
legatees and devisees as a result of an improper division or due to
events supervening the acceptance of the inheritance share.
28. G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at nS 26-30.
29. See, e.g., C. civ. arts. 212-14, 231, 442 & 450. The influence of the morality of a
good father of a family is apparent in the invalidation of certain contracts between par-
ties in a relation of professional dependence. It is also apparent in decisions where
family relations such as matrimony have been held not subject to commercial broker-
age because such brokerage is "dominated by the ideas of commercial traffic and
speculation." G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at n" 27 (writer's trans.).
30. C. civ. arts. 1674 & 1683.
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The "subjective" doctrine of lesion, which considered the ex-
ploitation of the promisee's contractual weakness and particularly
his lack of bargaining power, was not adopted by the French Code
Civil, as it was by the German Civil Code of 1900. " As noted by
Dean Ripert, the French Civil Code had not provided a remedy for
the case of contractual weakness other than the "somewhat brutal
theory of incapacity or the hazardous theory of vice of consent.3 '2
Objective lesion was one of the most important instances in which
Pothier's views had been overruled by the French Civil Code drafts-
men. Pothier had stated in his Treatise on Obligations:
[E]quity must govern contracts and when one of the parties suf-
fers lesion, even though the other did not bring it about by trick
or artifice, it is, in itself, sufficient to render the contract
vitiated. Because equity in commerce consists of equality, and
where such equality is destroyed and one of the parties gives
more than he receives, the contract is vitiated.33
One should hasten to point out that the warranty the Code requires
from the vendor against hidden defects of the thing sold3" is not a
substitute or functional counterpart for lesion. Lesion is intended to
apply to a sale even where, in the absence of a hidden or latent
defect, there is a significant or gross disproportion in exchanged
value.
The codal disregard of Pothier's point of view represented, first,
a conscious desire to reject what was regarded as the medieval
economic theory on a just price and, secondly, an adoption of the
principle that restrictions on contractual freedom have detrimental
effects upon commerce, a principle held in common by Locke, Ben-
tham, the Physiocrats, and Turgot. 5
At this point it is appropriate to review the findings of a 1958
study on the medieval meaning of just price by R. de Roover,' a
distinguished historian of medieval thought. According to de
Roover, there were two influential medieval views on just price. One
view, which he attributed to Henry of Langenstein, held that a just
31. The best comparative analysis of the development of the modern French and
German views on lesion is still by Dawson. See Dawson, Economic Duress and the
Fair Exchange in French and German Law, (pt. 1) 11 TUL. L. REV. 345, 364-76 (1937);
(pt. 2) 12 TUL. L. REV. 42, 49-53 (1937).
32. G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at n' 102 (writer's trans.).
33. R. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS n0 33 (1802) (writer's trans.), cited in 1. RIPERT,
supra note 25, at n° 62.
34. C. civ. art. 1641. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2520-40 (dealing with redhibitory
vices).
35. G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at n' 62.
36. de Roover, The Concept of a Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18 J.
ECON. HIST. 418 (1958).
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price was the reasonable charge which would allow the producer "to
live and to support his family on a scale suitable to his station in
life." If the producer charged more for his labor and expenses than
would enable him to maintain his status (per quanto res suas
vendendo statutum suum continuare possit), he committed the sin of
avarice. Max Weber attributed to this view the moral foundation of
the guild system (nahrungsprinzip). The other view, attributed to
Albert Magnus and Saint Thomas Aquinas, among others, and far
more widespread in Europe because of its adoption in canon law
sources, appears in a thirteenth century directive to parish priests:
flocks should be admonished not to charge wayfarers more than the
price obtainable in the local market (quam in mercato vendere pos-
sint); otherwise, the wayfarers can complain to the priest who is
then required to set the price with "humanity."88 The same
reference to the market appears in Albert Magnus' definition of the
just price as a price "according to the estimation of the market""9
(secundum aestimationem fori). This reference to market appears
again in Aquinas' answer to the hypothetical question: May a mer-
chant sell wheat at a prevailing price, or should he announce to his
buyers the possible arrival of new wheat which may cause the pres-
ent price to fall? 0 Although Aquinas himself would have announced
the possible arrival of wheat, the seller in his hypothetical is not
obigated to do so.
It is conceivable that what Albert Magnus meant by fori or
market was not merely the actual market price but the price
established by priests or by men of "humanity" as overseers of
market transactions." Be that as it may, it should be clear that,
37. Id.
38. Id. at 421.
39. Id. at 422.
40. Id.
41. Dawson, supra note 31, (pt. 1) at 365 (referring to the communis estimatio "of
informed and reputable members of the community"). R. H. Tawney reverts to the
view that de Roover attributes to Max Weber:
The dominant conception of Aquinas-that prices, though they will vary with the
varying conditions of different markets, should correspond with the labor and
costs of the producer as the proper basis of communis estimatio, conformity with
which was the safeguard against extortion-was qualified by subsequent writers.
In the fifteenth century St. Antonino . . . concluded that the fairness of price
could at best be a matter only of probability and conjecture, since it would vary
with places, periods and persons. His practical contribution was to introduce a
new elasticity into the whole conception by distinguishing three grades of prices
-a gradus pius, discretus and rigidus ....
R. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 41 (1961).
Ripert, like de Roover, refers to the Aquinas-Albert Magnus theory as an influen-
tial view, but also acknowledges the influence of a three-partite view on the just price
(summum, medium and infimum) and on canonic and pre-code lay law. G. RIPERT,
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prior to the enactment of the Code, there was a religious and
secular body of thought favoring the imposition of a just price and
disregarding contractual stipulations especially where there was a
sharp disparity between contract and market price. It should also be
clear that this tradition was rejected by the draftsmen of the
French Civil Code in all instances except in the law of decedents'
estates and in the sale of real property for less than seven-twelfths
of its market price, since it was thought that a just price was
detrimental to commerce.
Lack of Concern for Third Party Rights
The French Civil Code's concern for the integrity of the family
estate is matched by its lack of concern for third party rights, even
where the property involved is that which the Code considered most
valuable. Thus, while the possessor of the less valuable movable prop-
erty (res movilis, res vilis) was said to have a right equivalent to ti-
tle, the purchaser or mortgagee of real property was, up until 1855,
subject to secret or unrecorded liens and transfers." This situation
prevailed in large measure as a result of the legal effect attributed
to the will of the contracting parties. By establishing that the par-
ties' agreement was sufficient to effect the transfer of title to prop-
erty, article 1138 of the French Civil Code had accomplished more
than merely the "enfranchising" of the will of the parties. It had
also done away with the formal requirement of traditio, a formality
which in Roman times provided a modicum of notice and protection
supra note 25, at no 68. Regardless of the view on what is the just price, as pointed out
by Dawson, following the first world war French court decisions involving the effects
of inflation on monetary obligations made it abundantly clear that relief for inadequacy
of the price did not depend on a presumption of mistake or economic pressure, but
that the Code had given only a partial expression "to a principle which deserved its
own place in private contract law." Dawson, supra note 31, (pt. 1) at 375.
42. See generally Kozolchyk, The Mexican Land Registry: A Critical Evaluation,
12 ARIZ. L. REV. 308, 312-13 (1970). For an illuminating description of the abolition of
the real property law of the ancien regime and the process of elaboration of codal
rules, see P. SAGNAC, LA LEGISLATION CIVILE DE LA R11VOLUTION FRANQAISE: (1789-1804),
at 85-213 (1898). The following quote, attributed to Bigot de Preameneu, who opposed
the pre-codal system of protection of third party rights, is characteristic of the codal
attitude toward third party rights, "individual liberties" and "family secrets": "Le
systeme de publicit6 est une interdiction aux families de garder le secret de leurs
affaires . . .. Ce secret a toujours 60 regard6 comme un des principaux droits de la
libert6 individuelle .... " See 15 P. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARA-
TOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 237 (1827). Speaking in favor of the principle of immediate trans-
fer of ownership upon execution of an agreement of sale, Tronchet stated: "He who
buys does not require that the law adopt special measures for his safety. He has the ti-
tle before his eyes. He can verify the vendor's possession." 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE, pt. 1, n° 2607, at 543 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
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to third parties.43 Since the contract of sale created, modified, or ex-
tinguished rights in rem, regardless of recordation, a mortgagee
who had advanced monies on land on the basis of his mortgagor's
recorded ownership could still be subject to an earlier unrecorded
transfer of ownership."
Mutatis mutandis, he who was the protected owner could "enjoy
and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided that
they are not used in a way prohibited by law or regulations."15 The
problem with the owner's perception of this provision is that it en-
couraged such unneighborly and selfish behavior that it became
necessary for the courts, in partnership with doctrine, to develop
restraints on "abuses" of rights.4 Neighbors were told that they
could not erect fake chimneys simply for their nuisance value, nor
could they erect spires with which to prevent the landing of zep-
pelins on adjoining property in order to extort a higher price for
their own property. As with the immorality of contractual cause,
French courts had to resort, in Professor Cueto-Rua's words, "to
general or accepted principles of good faith, or of positive morality,
or [to] a widely recognized criterion of elementary fairness when im-
posing restraints on one's use of property."47
The Fairness of "Contractual" Justice
Dean Ripert, in his classic monograph The Moral Rule of Obliga-
tions, quotes a cryptic but revealing description of what "justice"
meant for the draftsmen responsible for the codal provisions on con-
tracts: "All justice is contractual, stated simply; he who says con-
tract says justice."'8 The meaning of contractual justice can best be
perceived against a totalitarian background in which most men are
simply not free to create binding obligations without official ap-
proval or intermediation. Under such circumstances the assertion of
article 1134 of the French Civil Code that "contracts lawfully
entered into have the force of law between the parties" is more than
43. On the abstract or third party protection features of traditio, see R. SOHM, IN-
STITUCIONES DE DERECHO PRIVADO ROMANO 159-60 (Sp. trans. 1951).
44. Kozolchyk, supra note 42, at 313.
45. C. civ. art. 544 (writer's trans.).
46. English speaking students of the doctrine of abuse of rights should be grateful
to the Louisiana Law Review for various fine articles on the subject. See Bolgar,
Abuse of Rights in France, Germany and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter
in Legal Doctrine, 35 LA. L. REV. 1015 (1975); Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Right, 35 LA. L.
REV. 965 (1975); Herman, Classical Social Theories and the Doctrine of "'Abuse of
Right," 37 LA. L. REV. 747 (1977).
47. Cueto-Rua, supra note 46, at 996.
48. "Toute justice est contractuelle, 6crit-il simplement; qui dit contractuelle dit
juste." G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at n0 22 (writer's trans.).
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a statement of the binding effects of a contract; it is also a political
affirmation of the citizenry's power to enter into all lawful con-
tracts-as equals. 9 In this sense also, pacta sunt servanda is not
merely a moral admonition, but becomes a cardinal principle of
autarchy and fairness. Contracts ought to be enforced as agreed
upon because "[ill faut donc affranchir I' homme. II faut d~gager de
ses entraves ]a volont6 humaine." In sum, the prevailing codal
ideology espoused the view that contracts were not merely the
repositories of the parties' intent but also of their binding concep-
tion of what was fair for each transaction." These contracts were in-
deed perceived as having been written in stone tablets.
Contractual justice discouraged resort to parol evidence to
establish the parties' course of dealing, usage of trade or custom. It
supported a notion of cause in bilateral or synallagmatic contracts
which required no determination of mutuality or of equivalence of
exchanged values, but merely a correspondence between what the
contract stated and what was given and exchanged. Contractual
justice also required good faith in the performance of obligations.
However, good faith was measured in most contracts not by what
other promisors, including an ideal promisor, would have done or
given, but by the observance of written stipulation. Accordingly, the
equality of rights to enter into contracts was confused with the fac-
tual equality of bargaining power; it was assumed that the former
necessarily entailed the latter. 52
Finally, contractual justice accorded preference to the rights of
49. For the doctrinal influences on the text of article 1134, see A. ARNAUD, LES
ORIGINES DOCTRINALES DU CODE CIVIL FRANCAIS 204-05 (1969).
50. P. SAGNAC, supra note 42, at 22.
51. There is support in medieval religious law for the proposition that a fair price
is reached by the mere fact that a bargain has been struck. See R. TAWNEY, supra note
41, at 42. In addition, as pointed out by Weill and Terre with regard to the notion of
cause, legal doctrine, since the sixteenth century, generally eschewed the use of con-
cepts which, by giving greater power to the judges, would compromise the stability of
contract. A. WEILL ET F. TERRE, supra note 17, at n° 253.
52. See generally Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion, 20 AM. J. CoMp. L. 53 (1968),
where it is stated:
But in the field of contracts, the Court of Cassation steadfastly clings to the letter
of article 1134 .. .and disregards the requirement expressed further in this arti-
cle-namely, that [contracts] should also be performed in good faith. Doctrinally
this trend is justified by considerations of legal security that would, in addition,
upset standing economic relations through arbitrary judicial power. Consequently,
the Court almost invariably reverses the more liberal decisions of the lower
courts rendered under their famous pouvoir souverain d'apprdciation-a
sovereign power of interpretation which, however, extends only to the interpre-
tation of facts-on the ground that considerations of equity would "denaturalize"
the clear and precise terms of the original contract.
Id. at 67-68.
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the parties to the contract, over the rights of third parties who
acted in reliance on appearances created by the parties to the con-
tract. Thus, a mortgagee who advanced monies in reliance on what
appeared to be the mortgagor's good title could be defeated by a
sale of the mortgagor's property subsequent in time to the mort-
gage. Similarly, a purchaser from an agent who acted with apparent
authority could have been affected by secret and undisclosed con-
tractual limitation on the powers of the agent.53
Interestingly enough, the power given to private parties to
create justice by means of contractual stipulations did not carry
over into the actual process of adjudication. Once the contract was
breached, the remedies were overwhelmingly judicial; self-help or
extrajudicial rescission, resale, or repurchase, when not disallowed,
were considerably curtailed.5 ' The Code did not trust the parties to
act as informal adjudicators of their own contractual controversies;
during trial, it did not trust the parties to tell the truth or to testify
objectively. 5
53. See C. civ. art. 1998; R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW (1970), where it is
stated:
The French Civil Code in its article 1984 uses the terms "mandat ou procuration"
as synonymous and interchangeable. This method of treating the agent's power
(to create rights and duties directly for the principal) merely as a byproduct of
the contractual relationship existing between principal and agent has been severe-
ly criticized as unsystematic. Planiol, one of the leading French authors, has been
among the critics.
R. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 537. In a note to Banque canadienne nationale c. Directeur
gdneral des imp6ts, Judgment of 13 ddc. 1962, Cass. ass. plen., D.1963.1.277, Professors
Weill and Terre note that this 1962 decision is the first formal occasion in the Plenary
Civil Branch where the principle of autonomy or separation of the powers ostensibly or
apparently granted to the agent from those powers in the underlying transaction has
been recognized.
See A. WEILL ET F. TERRE. supra note 17, at n° 253; 2 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL
no
s 134-136 (1957).
54. Compare C. CiV. art. 1184 (general rule) with C. CIv. arts. 1657-58. Note the
limitations placed on rescission as a matter of right in article 1657. Existing only in
favor of the vendor, it operates only after the buyer's failure to remove the thing sold.
For a historical analysis of the remedy of rescission in French civil law, see G. BOYER,
RECHERCHES HISTORIQUES SUR LA RESOLUTION DES CONTRATS 171 (1924), cited in 1 M.
SATANOWSKI, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO COMERCIAL 214-20 (1968).
55. See NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE (F. Kerstrat & W. Crawford
trans. 1978), where it stated:
[Tlhe parties themselves ordinarily are not eligible to be heard as witnesses.
Their statements can be heard by the court if the court finds it necessary to hear
them, but it will be in the context of a step different from that of the 6nquete,
and it is in fact rather unusual to order it. It is known as the comparution person-
nelle des parties.
Id. 'at xxvii.
For a very interesting description of the procedural principles that governed the
testimony of witnesses and disqualification of parties prior to the Code de Procedure
Civile du 8 octobre 1824, see M. BOICEAU, TRAIT DE LA PREUVE PAR TEMOINS EN
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Archetypes of Civility: The Selfish Man of Property and the Good
Family Man
The preceding enumeration of features makes it possible to
sketch the main characteristics of the model participant in our sim-
ple transaction. He is as comfortable with formalism and face-to-face
transactions as he is uncomfortable with, and distrusting of, infor-
mality and inter ausentes communications. He is a stickler for his
rights, to the point of abuse. He is wise and sufficiently well-
mannered not to get his property involved in the business of pros-
titution or of gambling; yet he is unscrupulous enough to charge
whatever he can get for what he sells, or as little as he can pay for
what he buys (with the exception of real property). He is not to be
trusted as an informal adjudicator of a breach of a sales agreement
in which he is the aggrieved party, nor as a witness in his own
lawsuit. For lack of a better term, I will refer to this civil code man
as the selfish man of property.
Side-by-side with this selfish man of property in the Code stands
someone who no less of a cynic than Voltaire described as virtuous
and sage-the father of the family. Get your soldiers married, advis-
ed Voltaire, and they will not desert you. In 1801, the "Institute de
France" announced a contest on the theme, "What should be the
limits of the powers of a good father of family in a well constituted
republic?" An authoritative chronicler quotes a representative con-
test submission for the following proposition: "The sentiment of obe-
dience is necessary in the French family. What is a more appropri-
ate means for instilling it than paternal authority? Paternity is a
sacred function; to disobey it is a sacrilege. Paternal power should
have the same force attributed to the Supreme Being.""' The Code
in large measure agreed with Voltaire's description and with the
quoted submission. As enacted, article 213 of the Code proclaimed:
"The husband owes protection to his wife, and the wife owes obe-
dience to her husband." In addition, the father of the family was en-
trusted with enormous powers over the lives and estates of his
dependents, including the power to incarcerate." In exchange, he
not only acquired the obligations of a usufructuary, but also, among
others, the obligation of feeding, supporting and educating his
children in accordance with available means.5 8 As a manager of his
MATIERE CIVILE 50, 241-42 (1789), where it appears that in large measure the question of
the credibility of participants in various transactions is, and has been since the time of
the medieval doctors, influenced by the fear that the transactions may be simulated or
fraudulent.
56. P. SAGNAC, supra note 42, at 353.
57. See, e.g., C. civ. arts. 376-79, 384.
58. See, e.g., C. civ. art. 385.
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dependent's estate, he was to act as a careful investor, employing a
degree of diligence higher than that required of an average person
or tradesman. 9
Even Planiol, a "no nonsense" code interpreter, in a most posi-
tivistic mood in which he indulged while writing a manual for prac-
ticing lawyers, found it necessary to describe the father of the
family's obligation of support as
[one] that rarely emerges from contract; in some instances it
arises from a will but most frequently it emanates from the law,
which imposes it on specified persons. When sanctioning this
obligation the law takes into account the moral duty to help
one's own[.] [E]ven if the law fails to express this obligation it
still constitutes a moral or natural obligation."0
The selfish man of property and the father of the family, there-
fore, live under sharply contrasting standards of fairness. The stan-
dard that prevails for the family man when required to care for the
members of his family is as described in an earlier study by this
writer- brotherly. 1
He must treat the business of family members which is under
his care not only as well as he would treat his own business, but in
some instances even better. His duties, as Planiol reminds us, have
nothing to do with contract or with monetary reward. In protecting
"his own," his duties rise above those that prevail in market place
transactions. As will be recalled, the standard of fairness of the
selfish man of property is often less demanding than that of the
marketplace; pursuant to contractual justice, the standard of fair-
ness is measured by what a party to a formal contract can get away
with, even if it is "unmerchantable. '6 2
General Principles and Civil Law Adjudication
The crucial question in determining what is representative of
the civil law treatment of our simple transaction is whether these
two creatures, the selfish man of property and the father of the
family, merely coexist, each fully ignoring the other, or whether
they influence each other. Skeptics on the human condition should
find some reassurance in the father of the family's exercise of a
59. Compare C. cIv. arts. 389, 450 & 457 with C. civ. art. 1927 (setting forth the
diligence of a bailee) and arts. 1991-92 (diligence of an agent).
60. 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS no 19 (2d ed. 1952)
(writer's trans.).
61. Kozolchyk, Fairness in Anglo and Latin American Commercial Adjudication,
2 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 219 (1979).
62. See text at note 52, supra.
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modicum of influence on the behavior of his selfish Civil Code
brother.
A mild influence is apparent in those instances where the Code
requires various contracting parties or estate holders to behave as
"a good father of family," as where they are supposed to employ
whatever means or resources are at their disposal (obligations de
moyens). As stated by Dean Carbonnier,
[iun such cases .... the contractual fault cannot be deduced mere-
ly from the absence of a promised result. The debtor's conduct
must be evaluated against what he should have done under the
circumstances. Article 1137 provides the formula for comparison.
It was intended for contracts involving the preservation of iden-
tified objects such as sold goods prior to their shipment, or for
leased, or pledged goods. Here the contractual debtor must act
as a good father of family. The bonus pater familias is a careful
and diligent man, an average man who is aware of his responsi-
bilities. He is responsible for slight or light fault but not the
slightest or lightest fault; that is to say, he is responsible for
culpa levis in abstracto.ea
The good father of the family's influence may be described as
mild in the above instances because it does not require the selfish
man to refrain from taking undue advantage of the other party's
contractual weakness or inexperience, nor does it require him to
behave in a truly brotherly fashion. The brotherly standard can be
found in the judicial interpretation of the code's general, almost pro-
verbial, principles in the areas of torts and unjust enrichment."
As insightfully observed with regard to the code's tort pro-
visions by Andr6 Tunc, an illustrious predecessor in the Tucker lec-
ture series,
[olne may quarrel with the famous saying of Kant defining law
as the means to assure "the coexistence of freedoms." Society is
not merely a coexistence of free individuals. It is also built on a
solidarity within a community of citizens. Life in society does
not only restrict the otherwise unlimited freedom that we would
enjoy if we were alone (assuming man could live alone), it also
entitles us to some form of brotherhood. The aim of law,
63. 4 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL-LEs OBLIGATIONS n0 75 (1976) (writer's trans.)
(emphasis added).
64. For the key general principle of the law of torts, see text at note 8, supra. For
the general principles of unjust enrichment, see C. civ. arts. 1372-80. Among other
obligations imposed upon the negotiorum gestor or manager of someone else's affairs
is that of continuing the management up until the time his principal's heir can assume
the management if the principal has died. The manager is in all cases under the duty
to use the standard of care of a good father of the family (bon pere de famile).
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therefore, is not only to protect and harmonize our freedoms,
but also to permit and promote the development of our per-
sonalities .... [T]his is especially true of the law of civil liability
[i.e., torts]. Its main purpose is to harmonize the relations be-
tween persons who have no special tie between them."
Tunc concludes that the French Civil Code's generic and open-ended
definition of tort has served this purpose by governing a range of
conduct as broad as "the lives of tenants in a collective building and
the conduct of large corporations engaged in fierce competition with
each other.""6
Similarly, the open-ended nature of the provisions for nego-
tiorum gestio and payment of a not due obligation-the two bases
for an unjust enrichment action in the Code 6 -made it possible to
enforce a wide spectrum of "brother-like" obligations. These ranged
from the altruistic payment of someone else's obligation of family
support, to the more self-interested payment of a secured debt of an
insolvent debtor by a creditor attempting to improve his chances of
collection."9 As perceived by a court decision quoted in Professor
Dawson's pathbreaking monograph on unjust enrichment, the gover-
ning principle was found in the equitable rule "that no one, not even
an incapable person, should enrich himself at the expense of
another."69
In understanding the operation of such a principle, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the standards against which controversial
behavior is measured are those which the court sees as applicable to
society as a whole, regardless of class or profession. The principles,
therefore, are supposed to pre-exist the parties' contracts or con-
tractual practices and to apply to "a minor," "a married woman," "a
possessor of personal property," or "a contracting party" and not to
"the landholders," "the merchants" or "the consumers." Thus, dili-
gence, morality, good customs or public order, although in signifi-
cant measure inspired by the figure of the good father of the family,
can be deemed applicable by the court, a priori, to any type of legal
relationship. Yet, it would be a serious mistake to assume that the
French judges' ability to rely on such a protean standard auto-
matically transforms them into powerful chancellors, willing and
able to impose on contracts and transfers of property, a morality
higher than the selfish man's.
65. Tunc, A Codified Law of Tort- The French Experience, 39 LA. L. REV. 1051,
1059 (1979).
66. Id. at 1064-65.
67. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 97 (1951).
68. Id. at 179 (summary of Cour de cassation decisions).
69. Id. at 178, citing Judgment of 15 juill. 1873, Cass. civ., D.1873.1.457.
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The Cour de cassation's preference for contractual justice over
equity, even in cases involving contracts of adhesion,"0 is a good il-
lustration of the limitations that weigh upon the equitable powers of
courts, either as a result of valid normative constraints or self-
imposed restraints. One may agree with the view, held by the Cour
de cassation in some decisions, that the court does not have the
power to review the terms of contracts, as these are questions of
"fact."71 Or, one may regard this view as merely a cover for the
court's unwillingness to make decisions that may be very unpopular
with influential sectors, preferring that such decisions be left to the
legislature. Whichever view is taken, the end result is the same:
judicial inaction."2
In conclusion, it is true that some of the selfish man's propensi-
ties for abuse or excess have been curbed by the courts' reliance
upon standards inspired in various versions of the morality and dili-
gence of a good father of the family. It is also true that the Code
itself rewards the selfish man's brotherly efforts in instances of
negotiorum gestio and proscribes unjust enrichment when one pays
what one does not owe. Yet, on the whole, the selfish man of prop-
erty remains an undesirable business associate, partner or co-
investor. On a day-to-day or professional basis, his method of doing
business-as reflected in his contracts and uncurbed abuses of prop-
erty-requires that he, as a "winner" in the legal relationship, take
all the profits he can get, while the other party or parties take as
little as he can succeed in letting them have.
THE COMMERCIAL LAW CONTEXT
Formality and Parol Evidence
Although the United States Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
does not regard the sale of real property as a commercial sale," the
real property law applicable to such sales seldom requires a special
formality beyond a simple writing. Printed or standard forms of
deeds of sale, warranty deeds of sale, warranty deeds and quitclaim
deeds, as well as suitable security devices, can usually be acquired
from bookstores or stationery shops, ordinarily being quite uniform
in fashion."4
70. See Bolgar, supra note 52, and authorities cited therein.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. U.C.C. §§ 2-102 & 2-105 (1972 version).
74. The standardization of real property transactions is no doubt attributable to
the presence of intermediaries such as real estate brokers, banks, and title insurance
companies whose own practices also tend to be standardized.
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The U.C.C. requires a writing for sales of goods that exceed
$500,"M but a merchant can conclude a contract for millions of dollars
over the telephone and then send a simple writing merely confirm-
ing the oral contract."8 If within ten days of the reception of the con-
firmation an objection is not made, the contract will be valid and
enforceable." In addition, some oral contracts will be enforced, as
where the buyer's order requires a special manufacture and the
seller has substantially commenced such a process before the seller
receives notice of repudiation, where goods have been accepted or
paid for, and where the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in court the existence of the contract."
Once the payment stage is reached, commercial law usually re-
quires that certain formalities be met when instruments such as
bills of exchange or checks are used. Among the formalities required
in these instruments are the place or date of payment; the amount
payable; the maker's, drawer's or acceptor's signature; and so on. By
comparison with notarial deeds, commercial instruments are usually
drawn by the parties themselves and are much less formal. It is also
noteworthy that, as a rule, the role of formality in commercial law is
functional in that it aids the enforceability of the promise by pro-
viding the operative setting such as a place for a signature, or
datum such as a date of maturity. In this respect, the role of formali-
ty in commercial law contrasts with the adherence to "solemnity for
solemnity's sake" that permeates many Civil Code transactions.
Hand-in-hand with informality goes a relaxed attitude toward
the admissibility of parol evidence. Since commercial intent must be
read in light of the course of dealings, usage of trade, and custom, it
is not surprising, for example, that the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co."9 that
the U.C.C. rejected the old rule which limited the introduction of
evidence as to usage of trade or course of dealing only to cases
where the contract is ambiguous. Even in a contract where the price
was clearly stipulated and which contained a clause clearly stating
that the contract contained all express or implied terms, the court
admitted parol evidence on usage of trade to contradict the stated
price. If the usage of trade was such that a stated price was merely
a projection to be adjusted to circumstances, such as the bottom
dropping out of the market, evidence of this usage was admissible
75. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1972 version).
76. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1972 version).
77. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1972 version).
78. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a) to (c) (1972 version).
79. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
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and decisive. In the view of the court, the usage of the trade had to
be admitted unless expressly negated."
Application to Face-to-Face Transactions and to Immediate Parties
Unlike the French Civil Code, the U.C.C. encourages transac-
tions entered into by parties at a distance.81 Under the U.C.C. provi-
sions, the court may find an agreement of sale even though the
moment of making the new contract is not clear from interchanged
correspondence.2
The attitude toward inter ausentes transactions exhibited by
the U.C.C. should not be surprising since, on the whole, commercial
law is an impersonal law, a law of "strangers" who have nothing but
their trade in common. In its formative period, from the ninth to the
thirteenth centuries, commercial law had to rely on the brotherly
ties and the friendship of Mediterranean and North Central Euro-
pean traders, who were for the most part Jewish and Arab mer-
chants." As the commercial law developed, reliance shifted from a
common religious or family bond to documents, records, and special
types of promises, ordinarily expressed in standardized written
fashion. In addition, commercial promises were, and continue to be,
to a large degree third party promises, such as that of the acceptor
in the bill of exchange and the promise of the surety or the in-
surance company in a policy or bond.
The Cause of Commercial Contracts
If by cause one means the terms in the first or underlying
bargain and exchange between two or more contracting parties,
which prompted subsequent transactions involving other parties,
then many commercial promises are "causeless" or, more appropri-
ately, "abstract."8 In an abstract promise the promisor is bound to the
80. Id. at 7-8.
81. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(2), comment (1972 version).
82. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(2), comment (1972 version).
83. See generally L. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 79-352 (description of medieval
trade); P. HUVELIN, ESSAI HISTORIQUE SUR LE DROIT DES MARCHES ET DES FOIRES 38-52
(1897) (description of some of the leading medieval fairs); S. GOITEIN, A MEDITER-
RANEAN SOCIETY -THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF THE ARAB WORLD (1967) (role of Jewish
and Arab traders); Goitein, Formal Friendship in the Medieval Near East, 15 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 484 (December 1971) (insightful ac-
count of the meaning of "brotherhood," especially in instilling trust among Jewish and
Arab merchants).
84. For a description of the operation of a typically abstract promise in letter of
credit law, see B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 454-82
(1966). Clearly, the concept of abstraction is one intended to promote the circulation of
goods (including paper). Thus, it finds its inspiration in the law of property.
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third party promisee regardless of the underlying cause. Take, for
example, the case of a bank in Baton Rouge that confirms a letter of
credit issued by a bank in Mexico City to pay for the shipment of
Louisiana crawfish to Mexico. What is the cause of the Louisiana
bank's promise to the Louisiana exporter of crawfish or beneficiary
of the letter of credit? Certainly it is not the Mexican importer's
contract with the Louisiana exporter, as banks readily disclaim any
involvement in such a contract and remind their lawyers that
"banks deal in documents and not in goods.""5 It is not the Mexican
importer's opening-of-credit agreement with his bank in Mexico
wherein he may promise, inter alia, to prepay the credit or to reim-
burse the bank, because the United States bank is not a party to
such a contract. Similarly, the cause cannot be found in the relation-
ship between the Mexican and the Lousiana banks, to which the
Louisiana exporter is not a party. Finally, the cause cannot be found
in the relationship between the Louisiana exporter and the confirm-
ing bank, because the exporter is under no contractual obligation to
the Louisiana bank; he may, in fact, disregard the existence of the
credit with impunity where the Louisiana bank is concerned.
Despite the absence of a contractual cause in the civil code sense,
the Louisiana beneficiary can enforce payment of the bank's promise
merely on the strength of that promise. Once the Louisiana bank ac-
cepts a draft drawn by the beneficiary and such a draft is negoti-
ated to a bank in New York, London, or Frankfurt, even if the
underlying transaction was the rental of a house of ill repute, the
Louisiana bank would, in most jurisdictions, have to pay on its ac-
ceptance."
Surely the confirming bank has a reason or cause to be bound in
its confirmation of the credit, but this reason is not found in the
original underlying transaction. Rather, it is found in the significant
economic value flowing to the bank as a result of the reliance by
third parties "or strangers" on the bank's promises. Herein lies the
main difference between the civil and the commercial notion of
cause. Cause for purposes of the U.C.C. is nothing more than what a
regular participant in the given market transaction would deem of
value when issuing his promise. Since an animus donandi is foreign
to commercial transactions, the promisor's intent is presumed to be
one of "value received" for his promise. This value need not be im-
mediately forthcoming; it could be a future value or even a mere
85. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 8(a) (Pub. 290, 1975). "In documentary credit operations all
parties concerned deal in documents and not in goods." Id.
86. See U.C.C. § 3-305(b), comment 6 (1972 version). See also B. KOZOLCHYK, supra
note 84, at 471-75, 534-40.
1979]
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
potential for value, as is the case, for example, with the U.C.C.'s
firm offer.87 To a layman, value may even be imperceptible; however,
courts must ascertain it not by looking at what the contract, says is
of value, but by looking at what the market, or what most regular
participants in the transaction, deem of value.88
This market determination, ironically enough, has resurrected
the Albert Magnus-Aquinas medieval notion of a just price and
installed it in a key position in the adjudication of commercial dis-
putes. 9 Resort to the market by way of establishing a course of
dealing or usage of trade, or that which is "reasonable," is well nigh
inevitable when the contract is vague, ambiguous or silent with
respect to key terms.
In addition, however, a market-inspired just price determination
is also common in U.C.C. adjudication when one of the parties has
unconscionably taken advantage of the other party's contractual
weakness or incompetence. 1 Thus, section 2-302 of the U.C.C. on un-
conscionability has been used to rescind mixed sales (ie., sales
which are commercial for the seller, but civil for the buyer) where
the weak consumer paid a purchase price of two and one-half times
the market value of the items purchased, or where the security pro-
vided by the buyer in the form of a cross collateral clause was deemed
excessive."' Finally, and most surprisingly for nineteenth century
commercial codes such as that of Mexico,8 certain U.C.C. provisions
have been relied upon by courts to justify this application of the
"objective" lesion doctrine in some disputes between experienced
merchants, thereby implicitly using just price as the equitable doc-
trine advocated by Pothier.94 It will be recalled, for example, that
87. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1972 version).
88. See Kozolchyk, supra note 61, at 232.
89. See note 41, supra, and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204(3) & 2-206(1)(a)(2) (1972 version).
91. See, e.g., Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 504, 247 A.2d 701, 703 (1968). The
New Jersey trial court held that a contract for the sale of a freezer priced at more
than two and one-half times its market value was unenforceable due to fraud in its in-
ception and inherent unconscionability. Id. at 504, 247 A.2d at 703. See also Kugler v.
Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452,
274 A.2d 78 (1970); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1967).
92. See Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968).
93. CODIGO DE COMERCIO art. 385 (Mex.) states: "Commercial sales shall not be
rescinded for lesion; the aggrieved party, however, may attach to the appropriate
criminal action an action for damages against the contracting party that has acted with
fraud or malice in the formation or performance of the contract .... " (Writer's trans.)
For a comment on the effect of this provision on installment or consumer sales, see
Warren, Mexican Retail Installment Sales Law: A Comparative Study, 10 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 15, 53-57 (1962). See also Kozolchyk, supra note 61, at 228.
94. See text at note 33, supra.
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals admitted parol evidence in the
Columbia Nitrogen decision to prove that, despite a clearly written
price stipulation (including an escalator clause), usage of trade
regarded such a stipulation as a mere projection, to be disregarded
when the price of phosphate fell precipitously. 5 It should also be
noted that the Columbia Nitrogen's reliance on just price is not dic-
tated by the U.C.C. rules on warranties. It is true that official com-
ment four to section 2-313 states: "But in determining what they
[the parties] have agreed upon, good faith is a factor and considera-
tion should be given to the fact that the probability is small that a
real price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo obligation.""
Yet, official comment four to section 2-615 warns:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the
rise in the cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which
alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise
or collapse in the market itself a justification, for that is exactly
the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed
prices are intended to cover. 7
Significantly, the Columbia Nitrogen decision does not rest on
the doctrine of unforseeability of risk or rebus sic stantibus, but on
its opposite. Merchants in the phosphate trade deal with precipitous
declines in market prices by adjusting their contract prices accor-
dingly; and such an adjustment rule is deemed to have been adopted
by the parties, unless they expressly and categorically rejected it."
As a commercial lawyer, I am happier with the Columbia
Nitrogen perception of lesion and just price than with that espoused
by comment four to section 2-615, which is almost identical to the
view expressed by Dean Ripert across the Atlantic." I have serious
difficulties with the assertion that a rise or a collapse of a market price
is "exactly the type of business risk which fixed price contracts are
intended to cover." Why not assume that business risks vary with
the nature of the business? Should one consider the producer of fer-
tilizers in the Columbia Nitrogen decision as much of a speculator as
95. See note 79, supra, and accompanying text.
96. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4 (1972 version).
97. See U.C.C. § 2-615, comment 4 (1972 version).
98. See note 80, supra, and accompanying text.
99. Dean Ripert states:
In times of crisis, where the volatility of values and prices is particularly intense,
such transformations are constant. A seller who has not suffered lesion the day of
the execution of the contract may suffer it if the money in which he has been paid
loses all its value three months thereafter, and conversely, despite the appearance
of the contract, it may be an excellent deal for the other contracting party . . ..
Such speculation is the very soul of commerce; if one allows rescission, one
destroys it.
G. RIPERT, supra note 25, at n° 71 (writer's trans.).
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a buyer of stock options or warrants, a "short" seller of shares of
stock, or a "futures" buyer of commodity contracts? Are there not
markets where price volatility is more of an assumed fact of life
than in others? If the fourth circuit is correct in its perception of the
commercial facts in the phosphate trade, it is a market where
participants are not expected to assume the risks of high price
volatility. Thus, the exclusion of sharp price fluctuations as a basis
for lesion, while justified in many instances by the market standard,
could well be unjustified in others.
Concern for Third Party Rights
Unlike the French Civil Code, the U.C.C. is quite concerned
about the rights of third parties, or of parties other than those in
the original or underlying transaction. Third parties protected under
U.C.C. provisions include: the bona fide purchaser of goods sold by
one merchant to another; the holder in due course of negotiable in-
struments; the beneficiary of a letter of credit and the holder in due
course of his accepted draft; the holder of a negotiable document of
title; the bulk sale purchaser or buyer of a commercial establish-
ment; the purchaser of investment securities; and the secured
creditor who, when advancing value, relies on the notice provided
by possession of the chattel or by the recording of his security in-
terest.
A third party earns the U.C.C.'s protection by giving value in
terms that the market for each particular transaction accepts as suf-
ficient. Additionally, he must act in good faith. Good faith is
reflected in some measure by the third party's willingness to part
with value and is ascertained by asking if the giving of value, as
well as the specifically disputed behavior, is reasonable or in accor-
dance with standards adhered to by most participants in the same
transactions. 0 Where the U.C.C. wishes to encourage the giving of
value to the utmost, it lowers the standard of diligence implicit in
100. This version of what constitutes good faith is at odds with the negative or
"semantic excluder" version advanced by Professor Summers. The "semantic excluder"
version holds that it is easier to define good faith by describing what is not bad faith.
Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). Unlike the "semantic excluder" ver-
sion, this version emphasizes the positive in the description (i.e., what good faith is), as
a discrete and knowable concept in U.C.C. provisions and in decisional law, asserting
that good faith is definable by resort to a market standard of fairness. This market
standard may find it convenient in some instances, such as in U.C.C. article three
transactions, to lower the required level of diligence, alertness or skill from a bona fide
purchaser, see U.C.C. §§ 3-302 & 1-201 (1972 version); but generally, it requires "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in trade." U.C.C. § 2-103 (1972
version). For a discussion of the market standard in contemporary commercial law ad-
judication, see Kozolchyk, supra note 61, at 258-64.
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the good faith requirement. In such instances, the third party is only
supposed to be "honest in fact," which means that he could be "empty
of head" where other merchants are concerned, as long as he is
"good of heart."10 ' Alternatively, where the U.C.C. wishes to encour-
age a "stop, look and listen" attitude, it requires from the third par-
ty the diligence reasonable in that trade.''
The Fairness of "Customary" Justice
Jeremy Bentham was not only an articulate and ardent advocate
of codification and critic of decisional law, but paradoxically he also
provided one of the classic arguments in favor of the fairness of
customary law. While objecting to the Aristotelian view of usury,
which is based upon the "barrenness of money" and the lack of justi-
fication of a monetary charge for the use of such a "fruitless" com-
modity, Bentham said: "[Aintecedently to custom growing from con-
vention there can be no such thing as usury; for what rate of inter-
est is there that can naturally be more proper than another?" ' It is
submitted that what Bentham said of one aspect of a commercial
transaction, the fair price of money lent, is generalizable as the most
common standard of fairness in the adjudication of commercial
disputes in developed trading centers. In these centers, the prevail-
ing legislative and judicial standard is determined by what most
regular participants in the transaction in question do when dealing
with each other.'" Thus, paraphrasing Bentham, where the market
standard prevails, antecedent to custom, growing from convention,
there can be no such thing as commercial law unfairness.
Note that in contrast with the civil code's "contractual justice"
standard, the standard in customary law is not necessarily contrac-
tual; it may or may not be contractual depending on the degree to
which contract approximates custom. To begin with, commercial con-
tracts are not regarded in developed trading centers as having been
101. Summers, supra note 100, at 211.
102. Id. Although diligence is a component of the good faith concept as defined by
a market standard of fairness, it should not be assumed that it applies to every aspect
of commercial activity, even within the context of the same transaction. For example,
as a bona fide purchaser of a check, a merchant is likely to be held to a lower level of
diligence and alertness than in selling or exchanging the goods which prompted his ac-
quisition of the check.
103. 3 J. BENTHAM, Defence of Usury, Letter IX, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
(1787). Bentham also stated, in the same connection: "[Blut if usury is good for mer-
chants, I do not very well see what should make it bad for everybody else ....
What I want to know is what there is in the class of men embarked in trade, that
would render beneficial to them, a liberty which could be ruinous to everybody else."
Id. at 13-14.
104. For a discussion of this standard of fairness, also referred to as the market
standard in contemporary commercial law adjudication, see Kozolchyk, supra note 61,
at 258-65.
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written in tablets of stone. Parmenides would have had a very hard
time with the U.C.C., for he would have insisted on the notion that
in each contractual relationship there is only one contract, the
"true" contract. The U.C.C., however, treats the sales agreement as
if it were Heraclites' river, in a state of constant flux leading to
many possible true contracts depending upon the stage of the con-
tractual relationship in issue before the court. If the problem con-
cerns the formation of the contract, then the contract could be said
to be the firm offer (with or without consideration), the oral conver-
sation followed by a written confirmation (accepted or unaccepted
by the recipient thereof), or the substantial commencement of the
manufacture of certain goods."5 If the problem is related to the ade-
quacy or sufficiency of performance by either party, the contract
may be said to be embodied in the parties' course of dealing or the
prevailing usage of trade or custom."6 Finally, if the issue is one of
adequate measure of damages for a contractual breach, the U.C.C.
has inspired courts to look at hypothetical agreements which would
compensate the aggrieved party even for its lost volume or future
sales, an item as to which the parties never truly bargained."7 Ben-
tham's description of customary law justice requires that fairness be
ascertained not from one isolated transaction, but from what is done
by regular participants on a regular basis. Consequently, we turn
our attention to the behavior of a model regular participant in com-
mercial transactions in a developed trading center.
105. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a) to (b) (1972 version).
106. U.C.C. §§ 2-207(3) & 2-208(1) (1972 version).
107. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 285
N.E.2d 311 (1972), where the court states:
The conclusion is clear from the record-indeed with mathematical certainty
-that "the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done" (Uniform Com-
mercial Code, § 2-708, subsection [21) and hence-again under subsection (2)-that
the seller is entitled to its "profit (including reasonable overhead) ...together
with any incidental damages . . . , due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and
due credit for payments or proceeds of resale."
It is evident, first, that this retail seller is entitled to its profit and, second,
that the last sentence of subsection (2), as hereinbefore quoted, referring to "due
credit for payments or proceeds of resale" is inapplicable to this retail sales con-
tract. Closely parallel to the factual situation now before us is that hypothesized
by Dean Hawkland as illustrative of the operation of the rules: "Thus, if a private
party agrees to sell his automobile to a buyer for $2,000, a breach by the buyer
would cause the seller no loss (except incidental damages, i.e., expense of a new
sale) if the seller was able to sell the automobile to another buyer for $2000. But
the situation is different with dealers having an unlimited supply of standard-
priced goods. Thus, if an automobile dealer agrees to sell a car to a buyer at the
standard price of $2,000, a breach by the buyer injures the dealer, even though he
is able to sell the automobile to another for $2,000. If the dealer has an inexhausti-
ble supply of cars, the resale to replace the breaching buyer costs the dealer a
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An Archetype of Commercial Law: the Decent
and Reasonable Merchant
Levin Goldschmidt, the great nineteenth century historian of
commercial law, had this to say about the archetypal merchant:
We have stressed the importance of the influence exercised by
economic views and conditions and by ethical considerations
(Treu and Gleuben, bona fides) in the formation of commercial
law. The ethical-legal genius of classical antiquity, and especially
of the Romans, created a model valid for all time, the honest
businessman (bonus vir), equally distant from brutal egotism and
from ultraterrestrial renunciation.
10 8
Karl Llewellyn seems to have been influenced by Goldschmidt
when he confided to Tennessee lawyers:
The way to write good law is to indicate what you want to do,
and you assume within reason, that the persons the law deals
with will try to be decent; then after that, you lay down the
edges to take care of the dirty guys and try to hold them in ....
I am willing to admit a certain amount of bad faith and stupidity
on the part of anybody today, but I am reasonable, and I don't
think general standards ought to be drawn with the assumption
that there is going to be unreasonableness.'"
How does the U.C.C. expect this decent and reasonable mer-
chant to behave when acting as a regular participant in commercial
transactions? First of all, the Code regards the reciprocal pursuit of
profit as decent and reasonable. In the case of sales, good faith
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." As indicated earlier, the no-
tion of a just price predicated upon the market standard is at the
root of what the Code deems as fair.110 In contrast with nineteenth
century European and Latin American civil and commercial codes,
the U.C.C. is willing to enforce a sales agreement that omits the
price, or the time and place for payment or for delivery of the
goods. The U.C.C. directs the trier of fact to find a "reasonable
sale, because, had the breaching buyer performed the dealer would have made
two sales instead of one. The buyer's breach, in such a case, depletes the dealer's
sales to6 the extent of one, and the measure of damages should be the dealer's
profit on one sale. Section 2-708 recognizes this, and it rejects the rule developed
under the Uniform Sales Act by many courts that the profit cannot be recovered
in this case." (Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales, pp. 153-54; and see Comment, 31
FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 755-756.)
Id. at 399-400, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 169-70, 285 N.E.2d at 314.
108. L. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 35.
109. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 782 (1953).
110. See text at notes 89-99, supra.
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price" by relying on market prices and valuations that are current
in the vicinity of the transaction.111
The underlying theory of compensation for breach of contract is
to place the aggrieved party in as "good a position as performance
would have done.'.. Where a given measure of damages does not
place the aggrieved party in such a position, the U.C.C. requires the
court to determine the profit that the aggrieved party would have
made had there been full performance by the party in breach. Thus,
if the aggrieved party is a seller, the court is required to take into
account items such as "reasonable" overhead in determining the
profitability, or the difference between cost and contract price."'
The justification for the above notions of decency and reason-
ableness can again be found in Bentham:
If there be an exchange, there are two alienations, each of
which has separate advantages. This advantage for each of the
contracting parties is the difference between the value they put
upon what they give up, and the value of what they acquire. In
each transaction of this kind, there are two new masses of enjoy-
ment. In this consists the advantage of commerce."'
The late and lamented Lon Fuller quoted from a famous theorist
of business organization to clarify the implications of reciprocal ad-
vantage:
[Tihe rule must be that you give, so far as possible, what is
less valuable to you but more valuable to the receiver, and you
receive what is more valuable to you and less valuable to the
giver. This is common sense, good business sense, good social
sense, good technology, and is the enduring basis of amicable
and constructive relations of any kind.",
Courts applying the U.C.C. have, by and large, adopted the same
view of decency and reasonableness. As stated by Judge Friendly
while elucidating the meaning of the term "chicken" in the famous
case of Frigaliment Importing Co., Ltd. v. B.N.S. International Sales
Corp.,"'8 "[pllaintiff must have expected defendant to make some pro-
111. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1 (1972 version).
112. U.C.C. § 2-708 (1972 version). See also Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d
393, 399-400, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170, 285 N.E.2d 311, 314 (1972).
113. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 285 N.E.2d
311 (1972).
114. 1 J. BENTHAM, WORKS 331 (1859), cited in L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 100 (3d ed. 1972).
115. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra note 114, at 100.
116. Frigaliment Importing Co., Ltd. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
[Vol. 40
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW
fit-certainly it could not have expected defendant deliberately to
incur a loss. 117 Thus, the decency of the decent and reasonable mer-
chant in the U.C.C. requires what a California appellate court
described as "an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that
neither party will do anything which injures the right of the other
to receive the benefits of the agreement." '118 Clearly such a covenant
presupposes a minimum of cooperation between the parties in the
seemingly antagonistic pursuit of reciprocal gain.
A significant element of this cooperation is the reliance on a
merchant's word. The U.C.C.'s decent and reasonable merchant must
expect and reward reliance on his representations or warranties,
especially by other merchants."9 In addition, he is expected to act
honestly or truthfully when entrusted with extra-judicial remedies
such as the resale or repurchase of goods in a sale agreement
breached by the other party,"' or with the payment of his seller's
creditors in a bulk purchase of a commercial establishment,"' or
with the foreclosure sale of the collateral in a secured transaction."'
He is also trusted to testify truthfully in his own lawsuit as to con-
tractual intent, course of dealing, and usage of trade.12 1
Finally, the U.C.C. assumes that a decent and reasonable mer-
chant possesses a modicum of professional skill and diligence. Thus,
the U.C.C. defines a merchant as a person
who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 24
Because of this assumption, the U.C.C. does not consider it indecent
117. Id. at 120.
118. Steinmeyer v. Warner Consolidated Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 515, 519, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 57, 60 (1974) (citations omitted).
119. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 2 (1972 version) states:
The question when the [implied warranty of merchantability] is imposed turns
basically on the meaning of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the
trade. Goods delivered under an agreement made by a merchant in a given line of
trade must be of a quality comparable to that generally acceptable in that line of
trade under the description or other designation of the goods used in the agree-
ment.
120. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-706(1) (1972 version) which requires that the seller's resale
be "in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner." For a similar requirement
on the buyer's cover, see U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (1972 version).
121. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 6-106 & 6-109(2) (optional sections) (1972 version).
122. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(3) to (4) (1972 version).
123. U.C.C. § 2-202, comment 2 (1972 version).
124. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1972 version).
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or unreasonable, for example, to bind a merchant to the terms of a
"confirmation," unanswered or unobjected to within ten days after it
is received."5 The U.C.C. also finds it decent and reasonable to pro-
vide priority to a secured creditor who files his financing statement
first, rather than to a creditor who made an earlier advance, even
though the first to file knew or could have known of the competing
creditor's security interest when making his later advance. 12 1 In
other words, the decent and reasonable merchant is assumed to be
diligent in his replies of commercial correspondence and in his recor-
ding of security interests.
Lest one conclude from the preceding description that the de-
cent and reasonable merchant is a paragon of virtue, it is now appro-
priate to examine the nature and scope of the principles that govern
commercial adjudication.
General Principles and Commercial Law Adjudication
The general principles that govern commercial law adjudication
are much more reduced in scope of application than those that
govern civil law adjudication. Despite the perennial attempts at "ob-
jectivizing" commercial law, understandable as these attempts are,
by the ever growing number of nonregular market participants,
commercial law is quintessentially the law of merchants. Bankers, in-
surers, wholesalers and retailers, carriers, warehousemen, and
brokers make their own law by the mere fact that they perform a
business function that other participants in the market transaction
find essential.
The general principles that emerge from such law making are by
necessity bounded by the nature of the business and by the factual
context of each type of transaction. An attempt to fashion or apply
principles as general as those of the French Civil Code (i.e., appli-
cable to "persons" without distinction of class or profession, or to
"goods" without distinction of the transactional context) is bound to
create intolerable inconsistency and confusion. Take, for example,
the principle that "in matters of movable property possession is the
125. U.C.C. § 2-201(2), comment 3 (1972 version) states:
Between merchants, failure to answer a written confirmation of a contract within
ten days of receipt is tantamount to a writing under subsection (2) and is suffi-
cient against both parties under subsection (1). The only effect, however, is to
take away from the party who fails to answer the defense of the Statute of
Frauds.
It is submitted that, procedurally speaking, once a defendant raises the defense of a
statute of fraud as his sole or main defense, the effects of depriving him of that
defense are more significant than the comment would lead one to believe.
126. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312, comment 4, example 1 (1972 version).
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equivalent of title." '127 Conceivably, this principle could equally war-
rant a bank's claim to the possession of the goods based on its
possession of a letter of hypothecation, a "purchase money"
creditor's claim to the goods based on the possession of a bill of
lading, or a carrier's claim based on his possession of the goods, and
so on. In order to resolve such disputes, it becomes necessary to in-
quire what kind of creditor is the possessor. This is legal shorthand
for questions such as the following: what kind of financing does he
do; how does he accomplish his financing; and how does his financing
contribute to the liquidity of the debtor's assets and with it, to
marketability of the goods in question?..8
In the final analysis, what constitutes a general principle in com-
mercial law adjudication is nothing more than a business practice ac-
cepted as valid by most regular practitioners of the trade. Thus, for
example, the principle which holds that "banks deal in documents
and not in goods"1" can only be understood and applied in the con-
text of bank documentary credit transactions. Even though this par-
ticular principle represents a consensus of what should be the
degree of a bank's involvement in a transaction underlying the issu-
ance of a letter of credit, it certainly would be inapplicable to a
bank's attempt to sell privately the collateral in a defaulted secured
transaction. Where business practices intersect and conflict, their
respective general principles will also conflict. Such is the case, for
example, where carriers conduct their business of carrying goods in
a manner that bankers find inconsistent with their business of ex-
tending credit on the strength of documents of titles issued by car-
127. C. civ. art. 2279 (writer's trans.).
128. Typical of the analysis alluded to in the text is the following:
[Tio what extent is the lienor harmed by being subordinated to legitimate
future advances (obligatory or voluntary) made under an existing loan agreement?
We have hypothesized successive loans on April 1 and May 1 with a lien attaching
on April 15. If the lienor has the machinery sold, he will succeed in reaching the
debtor's equity in the machinery (its value less the April 1 loan, if we have no
other interests to worry about). If he delays the sale until after May 1, he will
still reach the debtor's equity, but that will now have been diminished by the May
1 loan. However, the debtor's assets have not been depleted: the May 1 advance
balances the diminution of his equity in the machinery. The lienor will now
receive less from the sale of the machinery than he would have received before
May 1, but his chance of collecting his claim from the debtor's remaining assets
(which now include the May 1 advance) is as good as ever; presumably it is better
than ever since the debtor now has a new supply of working capital. Our lienor is
a judgment lienor and thus by hypothesis a creditor who was originally
unsecured. He does not seem to be unduly prejudiced by subordination to the
subsequent advance if he chooses to wait before having the property sold or
throwing the debtor into bankruptcy.
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 939 (1965).
129. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 85.
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riers. Mutatis mutandis, since the U.C.C. definition of "merchants"
clearly excludes consumers and since consumers are not represented
in commercial law making, the protection that consumers can expect
from the general principles of commercial law adjudication is at best
marginal. This is particularly true where the practice supporting the
general principle is widespread among merchants.
Consider the situation where a consumer reads and signs a form
contract and a promissory note common in the trade in question,
only to discover that he has received much less than represented
and assumed a far greater liability than he intended. Suppose that
the note finds its way to a bank which has given value on it to its
holder. Could the defendant consumer claim that he was "tricked"
into buying the product and signing the note and attack the status
of the holder in due course by alleging a general principle such as
"fraud corrupts everything"? The traditional commercial answer has
been negative. From a strictly commercial law standpoint, the court
would deem relevant the fact that the contracting party could
understand what he read, as well as the fact that the salesman was
demonstrating this product "with a view to an ultimate sale of it
and was utilizing a familiar technique of the commercial world." '
This is why the U.C.C.'s proscription of unconscionability in arti-
cle two,1"' the United States Supreme Court's curtailment of pre-
judgment remedies in secured transactions law," 2 and the Federal
Trade Commission's exclusion of paper generated by consumer tran-
sactions from the category of negotiable or "holder in due course"
paper 8' are not, in the technical sense, commercial law principles.
130. See Reading Trust Co. v. Hutchison, 35 D. & C.2d 790 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
131. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1972 version).
132. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
133. See 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975). 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975) provides:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to consumers, in or
affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of
that Act for a seller, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain the
following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT
TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT
HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER
BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
or, (b) Accept, as full or partial payment for such sale or lease, the proceeds
of any purchase money loan (as purchase money loan is defined herein), unless any
consumer credit contract made in connection with such purchase money loan con-
tains the following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
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I
On the other hand, a court decision that denies a warranty of mer-
chantability in the sale of cancer-inducing cigarettes because "[tlhey
are exactly like all others of the particular brand and virtually the
same as all other brands on the market,""'' applies a commercial law
principle in an orthodox fashion;" 5 the standard of merchantability is
dictated by the merchants' and not by the consumers' use of the pro-
duct. In sum, while the decent and reasonable merchant is more
cooperative and trustworthy than the selfish man of property, he is
far from being as brotherly or altruistic as is the good father of the
family in family law matters.
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF CIVIL LAW
The commercialization of civil law is readily apparent by exam-
ining the fate of institutions considered essentially civil by some of
the most influential draftsmen of the French Civil Code. Portalis is
credited with the statement that movable property is within the
province of commerce, while immovable property is particularly
within the domain of civil law. ' Yet, at the present time there are
very few "objective" commercial codes which do not list transac-
tions undertaken with a profit motive and involving immovable
property as commercial acts. In fact, the increasing marketability of
property, whatever its type, origin or purpose, is apparent in the
following developments:
1) A gradual erosion is evident in the traditional civil law princi-
ple that a debtor is responsible for his debts with all his property;
the tendency of modern law is toward specificity of in rem or ad
rem liability.' 7
2) Secured transactions are increasingly independent in nature;
for example, the real estate lien may be seen as independent from
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT
TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE
PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
See also Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022 (1976).
134. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting), adopted, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969).
135. See U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 2 (1972 version). This comment is quoted at note
119, supra.
136. See generally Ducharme, Les Operations Immobilieres et le Droit Commer-
cial, 81 LA REVUE DU NOTARIAT 5 (1978) (Can.).
137. C. Civ. art. 2093 states that "the property of the debtor is the common pledge
of his creditors, and the proceeds thereof are distributed among them pro-rata, unless
legitimate causes of preference exist between the creditors." (Writer's trans.) See
Kozolchyk, supra note 42, at 333 (discussing the principle of specification in modern
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the underlying transaction. Thus, the German Grundschuld (or terri-
torial debt) is not an accessory obligation to the, principal loan. The
marketability of this lien in the form of bonds or indentures requires
that it be created regardless of whether an advance was made prior
to the perfection of the security interest."'
3) In rem rights, such as the usufruct, are now monetized."' In
addition, certain traditional civil transactions, such as some long
term leases, have become subject to commercial law regulation as
bulk sales in cases where the long term lease involves a commercial
establishment (fond de commerce).4 ' In significant measure this
treatment results from a policy of providing greater protection to
third party creditors. For a similar third party protection reason,
the trend in real property law is not toward "causal" but toward
abstract adjudication. In other words, the future of real property
law does not belong to the pre-1855 French system of contractual
supremacy, with its sequel of secret or unrecorded liens, but to the
German Grundbuch system"4 -a system designed 'to protect those
who acquire property or advance monies on the strength of a record-
ing or a legally sanctioned appearance of a right in rem.
A 1939 French Cour de cassation"' decision particularly illustra-
tive of the trend involved a father who had simulated a sale of real
property to one of his children; the child in turr% mortgaged the
property to a third party. Another heir claimed the nullity of the
mortgage and alleged simulation, presenting some counter letters
purportedly embodying the true intent. The Court preferred the
mortgagee over the heir "because of the error that the force of the
appearances created with the lender when he decided to give value
on the strength of ostensible title." ' 8
land registry law and referring to the disappearance in Mexico of the practice common
until the late eighteenth century of creating mortgages on all the property of the deb-
tor, including after acquired property). For the imaginative use of the principle of
specificity in the contemporary law of secured transactions, see U.C.C. §§ 9-105, 9-106,
9-109 & 9-204 (1972 version) (classification and definition of personal property).
138. See BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH arts. 1191-98 (Ger.). These articles are discuss-
ed in 2 L. ENNECCERUS, T. Kipp & W. WOLFF, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL 189-92 (8th
ed. 1948).
139. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 568, added by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103. See also
Repo'rt by the Committee for the Revision of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870, reprinted in SPECIAL PAMPHLET-CIVIL CODE BOOK IT 49-72 (West 1978).
140. D~cret n' 53-960 du 30 sept. 1953, in CODE DE COMMERCE 475-86 (Dalloz 1976).
141. See Kozolchyk, supra note 42, at 314-16.
142. Judgment of 25 avril 1939, Cass. civ., D.P. 1940.1.12. This decisiqn is discussed
in A. WEILL ET F. TERRE, supra note 17, at 307-10. See also Judgment oT 13 d~c. 1962,
Cass. ass. plen., D.1963.1.277, discussed supra note 53, which applies the same principle
of protection of ostensible authority or rights.
143. A. WEILL ET F. TERRE, supra note 17, at 308 (writer's trans.).
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The civil code agency has likewise become an increasingly
abstract transaction, often as not protecting those who deal with the
agent who appears to have the power to bind his principal, against a
principal's claim of the agent's abuse of the power of
representation.1 " Notarial deeds are frequently boiler plate; for-
malities are fewer and less sacramental or awe-inspiring in nature;
and the fool-proof value of an "authentic act" in Louisiana, among
other civil code jurisdictions, has given way to the corrections of a
contractual or notarial error."5
THE CIVILIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
Equity and Predictability
While the commercialization of civil law is a widely known and
easily understood phenomenon, the "civilization" of commercial law
is not. It is submitted that the main reason for the lack of under-
standing is the longing for maximum certainty or predictability of
legal results that has always prevailed among commercial lawyers,
including some of the very best ones."6 It is widely assumed today,
as it was assumed by the followers of Bentham, Lockei Turgot, and
the Physiocrats during eighteenth century pre-codification France,
that commerce would suffer as a result of rules as "civil" in nature
as laesio. I am reminded of the apocryphal barrister who urged the
hesitant commercial law judge to decide the case and give him a
rule, good or bad; for with a rule, any rule, he could live, whereas
with uncertainty he could not. I am also reminded of an essay by
Shaw labelled Killing for Sport, in which the author warned the
reader not to be deceived by the nature-loving appearance of a holy
man as he walked carefully down a cool, grassy path, his eyes
riveted on the ground lest he step on the smallest living creature.
Wait, said Shaw, until the same holy man goes into his hot and
humid cave, tries to nap, and a mosquito or nasty fly lands on his
144. See note 53, supra.
145. See, e.g., Wilson v. Levy, 234 La. 719, 101 So. 2d 214 (1958).
146. See, e.g., Lord Mansfield's statement in Vallejo v. Wheeler, 99 Eng. Rep. 1012
(1774): "In all mercantile transactions, the great object should be certainty." Vallejo is
cited in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 656 (2d
ed. 1974).
Commenting on Hugo Grotius' contribution to modern legal philosophy, Michel
Villey of the University of Paris states:
Mais 'Europe moderne a cess6 de s'intdresser A ]a justice (au sens aristotdlian du
mot). Elle a ddsormais d'autres buts. Cette metamorphose du droit rdpond aux
desirs, aux besoins de la classe bourgeoise commerqante, de sdcurit6 dans la
richesse et les transactions commerciales; d'un droit rdglement6 rigide, aux solu-
tions prdvisibles.
M. VILLEY, LA FORMATION DE LA PPNSEE JURIDIQUE MODERNE 623 (1975).
1979]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
nose. Mindful of the Shavian holy man's probable reaction against
the nap-disturbing creature, one may inquire of the apocryphal bar-
rister whether he could live with a rule which stipulated something
like "no legal fees may be charged or collected for appearances
before this court," or the equally ominous, "your client, despite his
status as a holder in due course, is subject to all of defendant's real
and personal defenses." The point is not only that one should be
suspicious of appearances but also that there are some definite
limits to the types of rules with which a commercial lawyer can live.
Where his clients' interests are concerned, livability is generally
defined by what is a profitable business practice, as reflected in
course of dealing, usage of trade, and custom. For this reason the
predictability of customary law is not derived from its formal enact-
ment into law, codal or decisional, but rather from the fact that
customary law, more than any other source, reflects what merchants
do and think ought to be done. Courts recognize the principle that
"good business practice makes good law. 147 It could be stated with
equal conviction and factual support that good business practices,
those which are widespread and tested, hardly need a legal restate-
ment to become predictable among merchants. Thus, certainty or
predictability for merchants does not come from the official formula-
tion of a rule, but from the fact that the rule coincides with their
own well-trodden practice path. This path, however, may have been
cleared without having in mind a specific type or various types of
disputes; or the path may have been conceived of as an exclusive
passageway, allowing only merchants, or those in a given group or
class of merchants, to travel it safely. These are the situations
where commercial law, in its pure and "civilized" fashion, earns its
keep.
Commercial practices are usually formulated in the form of prin-
ciples and not of rules. Rules, as Professors Hart and Sacks tell
their Harvard students,'48 are the most precise of legal directives;
they require for their application a determination of the happening
or non-happening of events, or determinations of fact. 4" Principles
are more general and abstract, not being expressed in terms of the
happening or non-happening of events. They describe the result that
ought to be achieved and include, either expressly or impliedly, a
statement as to why it ought to be achieved." Consider, for exam-
ple, a principle well-established in letter of credit law: "[C]ompliance
147. In re Portland Newspaper Pub. Co., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D. Ore. 1967).
148. H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK-
ING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 155 (1958).
149. I&
150. Id. at 159.
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with the terms of the credit must be strict; there is no room in let-
ter of credit law for documents which are almost the same as stated
or which will do just as well.. 5 This principle clearly encourages a
business practice that requires diligent verification of the presented
documents to ascertain that on their face, as contrasted with veri-
fications based upon the underlying transaction, there is compliance
with the credit terms. Assume that the credit called for the presen-
tation of an invoice describing the merchandise as "hydrogen perox-
ide" and the submitted invoice described it as H,O,. Conceivably, the
court could invoke the principle of strict compliance and reject the
presentation of such an invoice. Yet, the principle does not require
the banker to be a brainless checking machine of corresponding let-
ters and punctuation; it assumes that the checker must use his judg-
ment, if for no other purpose, to determine what is and what is not
a "strict" compliance or what is and what is not the "same" docu-
ment. Moreover, the principle and the practice it is based upon do
not prescribe the rejection of a description which, although nominal-
ly different, is in fact the same as requested in the credit-a similar-
ity, incidentally, which the bank establishes not by looking at the
underlying transaction, but by construing the meaning of "hydrogen
peroxide" on its face. Thus, a court that would apply the principle of
strict compliance to the above factual situation, thinking that it em-
bodies the rule of rejection, would be confusing the forest for the
trees. It is precisely with respect to such a type of rule-making that
Dean Hamel, a French commercial and banking law expert, said that
"commercial equity would rebel" (l'4quitJ commercial s'insurge).'2
Hamel's reference to the commercial source of the equity is appro-
priate because the purported rule's inconsistency has its origin in
banking practice and in the market's standard of fairness. Good com-
mercial law-making in such a situation consists of fashioning a rule
or rules to take care of the unforeseen dispute in a manner consis-
tent with the principle in question, as well as with related practices
and principles. Good commercial lawyering does not consist of the
syllogistic application of general principles to facts; nor does it re-
quire an assumption that commercial law principles are universal in
151. See the landmark decision of Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, 25
Lloyd's List L.R. 90 (1926) (Eng.); 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 52 (1926) (Eng.). The case is
discussed in B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 416-20
(1966).
152. Hamel, Reflexions sur le Crddit Documentaire, in SWEDISH ASSOCIATION FOR
MARITIME LAW, LIBER AMICORUM OF CONGRATULATIONS TO ALCOT BAGGE 108 (1955).
"Contre ce principe d'autonomie, s'il est pouss6 A l'extreme, l'6quit6 commerciale
s'insurge." Id. at 111.
For a contemporary discussion of the same theme, see Epschtein & Bontoux, Reflex-
ions sur le Formalisme du Crddit Documentaire, 1972 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 396 (Belg.).
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nature, applicable urbi et orbi. Rather, good commercial lawyering
consists of the meticulous qualification or disqualification of parties
as protected participants in the relevant practice. It would be a poor
commercial lawyer who assumes that anyone who looked and acted
as a bona fide purchaser of property, holder in due course, or
creditor with a perfected security interest is such. The adjudication
of commercial law is a process of characterization of the parties' pro-
tected or unprotected status. 3 In such a process there is always
room for considerations ex aequo et bono.''
If the conflict involves competing business practices and prin-
ciples or results from a widespread commercial practice which ex-
ploits the contractual weaknesses of consumers, the relevant equity
is civil. Its civil nature is derived from the adjudicator's reliance on
principles general enough to encompass the interests of competing
business groups and consumers, as well as merchants.
Civil equity is particularly apparent in court decisions ema-
nating from important trading centers, cutting across the entire
spectrum of commercial transactions. German courts have used the
doctrines of abuse of rights, good customs (boni mores), and good
faith in business associations law, exploitive agency, distributive
agency, distributorship agreements, and in commercial-consumer
relationships. 5 French courts have relied upon the abuse of rights
doctrine in suits to curb the power of majority stockholders and
153. Speidel, Summers and White make an insightful observation on the present
state of decisional negotiable instruments law in the United States:
One who reads many holder in due course cases will soon discover that the
usual issue is not over the legal rights of a holder in due course but over whether
the plaintiff is a holder in due course. That is, the drawer, maker, indorser or
such says: "You are not a holder in due course because you are not a holder,
because you did not give value, because you had notice or for some other reason."
Seldom is there serious quarrel about the legal consequences if the plaintiff can
establish his status as a holder in due course.
R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, supra note 146, at 1298.
154. Or, as stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
there is "some leaven in the loaf of strict construction." Banco Espaflol de Crddito v.
State Street Bank and Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1967).
155. See, e.g., R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 53, at 478-84, 490-97 (translation of Ger-
man court decisions). See also Dawson, supra note 31, (pt. 2) at 65-72.
The Louisiana courts have likewise been shown to be sympathetic to the problems
of consumers who have dealt with a more knowledgeable creditor. See Hersbergen, On
the Necessity or Desirability of Consumerism-Inspired Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code-A Summary of Research Undertaken and Tentative Conclusions Reached, 10
REVUE GtItNRALE DE DROIT 29 (1979) (Can.). Professor Hersbergen's research has in fact
established that virtually all of section 2-302's "unconscionable" contracts cases involv-
ing consumers have Louisiana Civil Code decisional equivalents. Hersbergen, supra, at
71-73.
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upon tort principles in actions for unfair competition; 6 courts in the
United States have applied similar doctrines when annulling over-
reaching terms in installment sales and in secured transactions, or
where economic duress has lead to a grossly disproportionate ex-
change of values.157
Resort to commercial and civil equitable principles of adjudica-
tion is, therefore, inevitable with respect to many rules, principles
and practices. Moreover, resort to commercial and civil equity, con-
trary to conventional wisdom, renders commercial law not less, but
more, predictable. Commercial equity reinstates the market stan-
dard of fairness where it was rejected or perverted by poor ad-
judication. Civil equity prevents a distorted or one-sided application
of the market standard where one practice is preferred over
another, or where a weak consumer is deemed to possess the same
bargaining power of a trade group for reasons other than everyone's
common good. By balancing the results of an unequal bargaining
power, civil equity helps restore a reliance in legal (orderly and
stable) methods of doing business.158
The Brotherly Standard of Fairness and Commercial
Law Institutions
Another aspect of the civilization of commercial law which is not
well understood is the role of the brotherly standard of fairness, as
apparent in the family duties of a good father of the family,'59 in the
formation and development of commercial legal institutions. Richard
Baxter's Christian Directory, which R. H. Tawney describes as one
of the most widely read books in late seventeenth century
England, ' and which was intended to be a Summa Theologica and
Moralis for cities "like Rome or London and not for a fool's
paradise,"'61 contains advice which Tawney paraphrases as follows:
156. For an example of a French court decision using the abuse of rights doctrine
to protect minority stockholders from majority stockholders' actions, see Cueto Rua,
supra note 46, at 1102 n.106. For application of this principle to unfair competition
litigation, see Derenberg, The Code and Unfair Competition, in THE CODE NAPOLEON
177, 188 (B. Schwartz ed. 1956).
157. See authorities cited at notes 91 & 92, supra.
158. For a description of the effects of abusive contractual stipulations and collec-
tions practices in Costa Rica and its displacement of "official" legal institutions and of
certainty of collection, see Kozolchyk, Toward a Theory on Law in Economic Develop-
ment: The Costa Rican U.S. AID-ROCAP Law Reform Project, 1971 LAW AND
SOCIAL ORDER 681, 714-35.
159. See text at notes 57-62, supra.
160. R. BAXTER, A CHRISTIAN DIRECTORY (1677), cited in R. TAWNEY, supra note 41,
at 183.
161. R. TAWNEY, supra note 41, at 184.
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The Christian, he insists, is committed by his faith to the accep-
tance of certain ethical standards, and these standards are as
obligatory in the sphere of economic transactions as in any other
province of human activity. To the conventional objection that
religion has nothing to do with business-that "every man will
get as much as he can have and that caveat emptor is the only
security"-he answers bluntly that this way of dealing does not
hold among Christians. Whatever the laxity of the law, the
Christian is bound to consider first the golden rule and the pub-
lic good. "It is not lawful to take up or keep up any oppressing
monopoly or trade, which tends to enrich you by the loss of the
Commonwealth or of many."
He must carry on his business in the spirit of one who is
conducting a public service; he must order it for the advantage
of his neighbor as much as, and, if his neighbor be poor, more
than, for his own. He must not desire "to get another's goods or
labour for less than it is worth."
Rivalry in trade, Baxter thinks, is inevitable. But the Chris-
tian must not snatch a good bargain "out of greedy covetous-
ness, nor to the injury of the poor . . . nor . . . so as to disturb
that due and civil order which should be among moderate men in
trading."'
Despite its wide readership, it is Tawney's conclusion that Bax-
ter's Directory succeeded even less than the "Popes and Doctors,
whose teaching, not always unwittingly [it] repeated." ' 3 A cursory
review of commercial law developments since mid-eighteenth cen-
tury English commercial law, however, makes one wonder whether
Tawney's dismissal of the brotherly standard should have been as
unqualified. Justice Story's 1846 comparative study of the law of
bailments, for example, shows that English and American law
adopted the same division of slight and great diligence on the part
of the bailee that prevailed in European law:
[WIhen the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailor, the law
requires only slight diligence on the part of the bailee and of
course makes him answerable only for gross neglect. When the
bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailee, the law requires
great diligence of the bailee and makes him responsible for
slight neglect. When the bailment is reciprocally beneficial to
both parties, the law requires ordinary diligence on the part of
the bailee, and makes him responsible for ordinary neglect.'"
162. Id. at 185.
163. Id. at 188.
164. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM
THE CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW §§ 22-25 (4th ed. 1846).
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J. W. Smith's Compendium of Mercantile Law'6 5 quotes an 1809
admiralty decision on the duties of a shipmaster as follows:
[A] ship is in a foreign country, where there is no correspondent
of the owners, and no money to be had on hypothecation to put
her into repair; under these circumstances what is to be done?
The ship may rot before the master can hear from his owners;
and therefore if the necessity were clearly shown, with full proof
that everything was done optima fide, for the real benefit of the
owners, the Court might be disposed to sustain a purchase so
made.""
In 1810, an appellate court in New York held that when a seller
resold merchandise wrongfully refused by the buyer, the sellers
were
by necessity defendants' trustees to manage [the merchandise];
and being thus constituted trustees or agents, of the defendants,
they must either abandon the property to destruction, by refus-
ing to have any concern with it, or take a course more for the
advantage of the defendant by selling it. There is a strong
analogy between this case and that of the assured, in case of an
abandonment. In both cases, the party in possession is to be con-
sidered an agent to the other party, from necessity."7
In Price v. Neal,"8 decided in 1762, Lord Mansfield held that a
drawee of two forged bills of exchange who paid one and accepted
the other could not collect monies paid to the payee because the
drawee had the duty "to be satisfied 'that the bill drawn upon him
was [of] the drawer's hand,' before he accepted or paid it."' 9 Such a
duty of inquiry did not weigh upon the holder who had given value
innocently. Lord Mansfield admitted that the drawee could have
been similarly innocent; yet he concluded that "there is no reason to
throw off the loss from one innocent man upon another innocent
man."'70 In placing the loss and failure of diligence squarely on the
drawee's shoulders, Lord Mansfield had fashioned a duty of dili-
gence of far reaching consequences in the relations between banks,
as drawees, and holders of checks drawn on the banks.
By the early nineteenth century, a standard of good faith to
165. J. SMITH, COMPENDIUM OF MERCANTILE LAW 241 (3d ed. 1873), quoting Fanny
and Elmira, 165 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1809).
166. J. SMITH, supra note 165.
167. Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. Ch. 595, 4 Am. Dec. 374, 377 (N.Y. 1809).
168. 3 Burrow's Reports 1354 (1762) (Eng.), quoted in P. THAYER, THE LAW MER-
CHANT 588-90 (1939).
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govern the relations between the trustee and the beneficiary had
been adopted in the law of trusts, a standard which was higher than
that of ordinary contracting parties in the market place.171 Justice
Cardozo referred to this standard as uberrima fides and described it
as follows:
Some relations in life impose a duty to act in accordance with
the customary morality and nothing more. In those, customary
morality must be the standard for the judge. Caveat emptor is a
maxim that will often have to be followed when the morality
which it expresses is not that of sensitive souls. Other relations
in life, e.g., those of the trustee and beneficiary, or principal and
surety, impose a duty to act in accordance with the highest stan-
dards which a man of the most delicate conscience and the nicest
sense of honor might impose upon himself. In such cases to en-
force adherence to those standards becomes the duty of the
judge. 172
The above rules concerning bailments for the benefit of the
bailee, powers of a shipmaster under calamitous circumstances,
powers of a seller at the time of the buyer's breach, diligence of a
drawee paying a draft with a forged signature, and the exercise of
good faith by trustees have certain common elements. The first ele-
ment in common is entrustment. The bailee, shipmaster, seller,
drawee and trustees have all been entrusted with someone else's
goods or services for a given purpose. In some instances the entrust-
ment is voluntary; in others, such as in the case of the right of the
shipmaster and seller to sell or resell, the entrustment stems from
the law. The second element is that the entrustment is part of the
professional or commercial activities of the trustee. It is, to be sure,
171. See 1 J. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUST AND TRUSTEES § 401 (1929).
Perry compiles citations to eighteenth and nineteenth century decisions for rules as
such. Id. at § 401 n.1. A trustee, having accepted a trust, cannot renounce it. He can-
not free himself from liability by mere renunciation. He must be discharged by a court
of equity or by a special power in the instrument of trust, or by the consent of all the
parties interested in the estate, if they are sui juris. Id. "A trustee is bound to exer-
cise ordinary care and judgment, and it is no excuse for him that he did not possess
them; by accepting a trust, whether gratuitous or not, he undertakes that he does
possess and will exercise them." Id.
Note that although the trustee is said to be bound by a standard of "ordinary care,"
such a standard according to the quote is exacted even where the trust is gratuitous.
Furthermore, as stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Kay v. Bostwick, 83 Fla. 308,
310, 91 'So. 112 (1922), "[tlrustees are designated for fiduciary services, and their con-
trolling duty is faithful and efficient conservation of the trust. Compensation to the
trustees, when permissible, is for services rendered to the trust; and it should be
reasonable with prime reference to conserving the trust." (Emphasis added.)
172. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 109-10 (1921).
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not an imposition of a totally altruistic or brotherly conduct. The im-
posed duties enhance the trustee's ability to do business either by
allowing him to re-employ his efforts in the most commercially
reasonable manner, or by increasing his trustworthiness in the com-
mercial community, or both.
The third common element is the imposition of a duty of
diligence and a requirement of good faith on the trustee. This duty
is not predicated on what most merchants would do when acting
with a view to their own advantage, but rather on what is in the
best interests of both parties, or the entrusters. As the degree of
entrustment increases, so does the stringency of good faith. In a
situation of maximum entrustment, such as when the trustee acts in
a self-interested manner with the beneficiary's property, the stan-
dard is strictest. As stated in In re James, "[wihen, however, the
trustee acts in his own interest in connection with the performance
of his duties as trustee, the standard of behavior becomes more




The combination of an agreed upon or legally imposed entrust-
ment with the imposition of duties of diligence and good faith higher
than those prevailing in the market still constitutes the best formula
for inducing reliance on commercial legal institutions. Such a
reliance is a prerequisite to* the development of the institution.
Legislators, courts, and doctrinal writers will refine the commercial
institution in vain if those who participate in the basic transaction,
whether it is a sale of goods, a loan of money or an investment in a
profit sharing enterprise, do not trust or rely on each other.
Sometimes the chosen trustee, a personification of Goldschmidt's
honest merchant or Llewellyn's decent and reasonable merchant, is
a well-established commercial institution such as a bank or insurance
company. Sometimes, however, as it occurs with one of the most
common forms of obtaining consumer credit in Latin American ur-
ban centers, the trustee is not an established commercial institution
but the most respected and trusted person in a given neighborhood,
such as the Mexican widows and "mothers of families" who run a
pool known as "La Tanda" in Mexico City.1"' They will organize the
173. 86 N.Y.S.2d 78, 89-90 (1948).
174. See P. Karon, Law, Fairness and Non-Institutional Credit in Mexico, at 7-13
(Dec. 11, 1976) (unpublished paper in University of Arizona, College of Law, Foreign
Law Collection).
Comparable methods for the pooling of funds of borrowers without access to
established or official lending sources were observed by the author in Costa Rica. See
C. Knight, J. Finch & B. Kozolchyk, Law and Consumer Credit in Costa Rica (Dec.
1969) (unpublished manuscript in University of Arizona, College of Law, Foreign Law
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pooling of money by collecting weekly or monthly contributions,
determine the manner in which the lottery, raffle or loan approval
procedure will be conducted, and disburse loan moneys and collect
repayment. They will be entitled to a first draw and may even be
entitled to subsequent preeminent rights; in exchange they are
responsible to the contributors with their own funds when a given
borrower fails to repay his loan. 75 The analogy to the powers and
duties of the French Civil Code's good father of the family, when
dealing with property of those under his care, is clear and signifi-
cant.
CONCLUSIONS
The commercialization of civil law implies the elimination of
unnecessary formality, an increase in the cooperation and trustwor-
thiness of contracting parties, and the protection of the rights of
third parties, such as secured creditors and bona fide purchasers,
whose participation is essential in the functioning of a marketplace.
Commercialization is the product of utilitarian morals or of the
enlightened self-interest of the regular participants in the
marketplace. The civilization of commercial law consists in raising
the morality of the marketplace by relying on a more altruistic stan-
dard of fairness, designed to protect regular as well as non-regular
market participants.
The pressures to commercialize and civilize are relentless and
never ending. On the one hand, today the family estate is made
more accessible to commercial creditors;... and, on the other, a very
substantial number of transactions that just a few years ago would
have qualified the holder of the paper as a holder in due course do
so no more. 7' Although it would seem that a critical point has been
reached in the commercialization-civilization interaction and that the
time for final and irreversible decisions is near, in effect this is but
another manifestation of social man's ancient dilemma, as described
by Hillel, the Jewish sage: "If I am not for myself who will be for
me, and if I am only for myself, what am I?" Even if this dilemma
Collection). Section 2, part B of this study describes methods comparable to those in
Mexico. Similar pooling methods were described to the author by Dominican Republic
lawyers and anthropologists.
175. P. Karon, supra note 174, at 9.
176. See, e.g., Pascal, Louisiana 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53 TUL. L.
REV. 105 (1978), where it is stated: "Under the only provision relating to liabilities dur-
ing the regime, any obligation of either spouse, conventional or nonconventional,
antenuptial or postnuptial, entitles the creditor to obtain execution out of the com-
munity assets and the separate assets of the debtor spouse." Id. at 113-14.
177. See authorities cited in notes 1-7, supra.
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cannot be satisfactorily resolved, and chances are that it cannot,
nevertheless, there is solace in what has been learned by examining
the commercial-civil interaction. Not only has it helped discern the
morality that underlies private law but also that which makes
private law possible.

